Contact investigation after a fatal case of extensively  drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in an aircraft,  Germany, July 2013 by Heiden, Maria an der et al.
1www.eurosurveillance.org
Research article
Contact investigation after a fatal case of extensively 
drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in an aircraft, 
Germany, July 2013
M an der Heiden ¹ , B Hauer ¹ , L Fiebig ¹ , G Glaser-Paschke ² , M Stemmler ³ , C Simon ⁴ , S Rüsch-Gerdes ⁵ , A Gilsdorf ¹ , W Haas ¹ 
1. Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany
2. Zentrum für tuberkulosekranke und -gefährdete Menschen, Gesundheitsamt Lichtenberg, Berlin, Germany
3. Gesundheitsamt Reinickendorf, Berlin, Germany
4. Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, Berlin, Germany
5. National Reference Centre for Mycobacteria, Borstel, Germany
Correspondence: Maria an der Heiden (anderheidenma@rki.de)
Citation style for this article: 
an der Heiden M, Hauer B, Fiebig L, Glaser-Paschke G, Stemmler M, Simon C, Rüsch-Gerdes S, Gilsdorf A, Haas W. Contact investigation after a fatal case of 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in an aircraft, Germany, July 2013. Euro Surveill. 2017;22(12):pii=30493. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2807/1560-
7917.ES.2017.22.12.30493 
Article submitted on 12 August 2016 / accepted on 15 December 2016 / published on 23 March 2017
In July 2013, a passenger died of infectious extensively 
drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) on board of an 
aircraft after a 3-hour flight from Turkey to Germany. 
Initial information indicated the patient had moved 
about the aircraft coughing blood. We thus aimed to 
contact and inform all persons exposed within the air-
craft and to test them for newly acquired TB infection. 
Two-stage testing within 8 weeks from exposure and at 
least 8 weeks after exposure was suggested, using 
either interferon gamma release assays (IGRAs) or 
tuberculin skin test (TST). The TST cut-off was defined 
at a diameter > 10 mm; for differentiation between 
conversion and boosting, conversion was defined as 
increase of skin induration > 5 mm. Overall, 155 pas-
sengers and seven crew members were included in the 
investigation: the questionnaire response rate was 
83%; 112 (69%) persons were tested at least once for 
TB infection. In one passenger, who sat next to the 
area where the patient died, a test conversion was 
registered. As of March 2017, no secondary active TB 
cases have been reported. We describe an unusual 
situation in which we applied contact tracing beyond 
existing European guidelines; we found one latent 
tuberculosis infection in a passenger, which we con-
sider probably newly acquired.
Introduction
In July 2013, the responsible German health authori-
ties were informed about a young adult passenger 
who died from acute massive haemoptysis on board 
of an aircraft travelling from Turkey to Germany. They 
were travelling alone and had taken a previous flight 
from a country in the eastern part of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) European Region to Turkey; no 
passenger from the second flight with the incident had 
shared the first flight.
The aircraft from Turkey to Germany was almost fully 
booked with 156 of 181 seats occupied. Several passen-
gers stated initially that the passenger who later died 
on the plane had moved about the aircraft during the 
3-hour flight coughing blood; furthermore, the patient 
had mentioned having tuberculosis (TB) to one of the 
passengers, so this information became quickly known 
to the persons giving first aid. First aid was given in the 
back part of the aircraft (in the cabin toilet area). Four 
days after the event, autopsy results confirmed that the 
deceased passenger had infectious cavitary pulmonary 
TB. Besides the lungs, no other organs were affected. 
By molecular diagnostic, specific genome sequences 
belonging to the Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex 
were detected from swabs taken during autopsy from 
the trachea, the bronchi and both lungs.
Germany is a low TB incidence country with a TB noti-
fication rate of 5.2 cases per 100,000 population in 
2012, the year preceding the event, corresponding to 
an absolute case number of 4,220 [1].
The overall rate of multidrug-resistant (MDR)-TB 
between 2002 and 2013 in Germany was 0.7% among 
patients born in Germany. However, the patient came 
from one of the 27 countries with a high MDR-TB bur-
den. For these countries, WHO estimated in 2008 at 
least 4,000 MDR-TB cases occurring annually and/or at 
least 10% of newly registered TB cases with MDR [2]. 
Hence, the origin of the patient raised a suspicion of 
MDR-TB.
The involved German health authorities immediately 
initiated a risk assessment that was based on the 
Risk assessment guidelines for infectious diseases 
transmitted on aircraft (RAGIDA) for TB criteria [3] and 
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guided by the analysis of this dramatic and unusual 
fatal event. Overall, the risk of attracting a TB infection 
after flight exposure is assessed to be very low [4,5]. A 
summary of evidence on TB transmission on aircraft in 
2016 included 21 studies and data collected from 279 
flights [5]. Among 2,791 contacts tested, the authors 
estimated that 0.1–1.3% of aircraft contacts in flights 
lasting more than 8 hours might have contracted the 
infection from a sputum-smear-positive index patient.
Contact tracing is generally not recommended on 
flights of less than 8 hours duration and there is lit-
tle evidence of TB transmission during air travel [4,5]. 
However, considering the severity of symptoms, includ-
ing massive haemoptysis, the reported mobility of 
this potentially highly infectious passenger within the 
aircraft and the known drug resistance rates in the 
patient’s home country, the decision was made to start 
comprehensive contact tracing investigations of all 
passengers and crew members.
The contact investigation procedures were initiated 
within 3 days after the fatal event while waiting for 
antimicrobial drug susceptibility testing (DST) results 
of autopsy samples by the German National Reference 
Center for Mycobacteria in Borstel. Two weeks after the 
flight, DST results confirmed resistance to rifampicin. 
Another two weeks later, the National Reference Centre 
for Mycobacteria reported to the local health author-
ity that the patient suffered from extensively drug-
resistant XDR-TB, resistant to isoniazid, rifampicin, 
protionamide, pyrazinamide, ethambutol, streptomy-
cin, ofloxacin, moxifloxacin, amikacin, capreomycin 
and rifabutin. The isolated M. tuberculosis strain was 
sensitive to linezolid only. Preventive treatment was 
not an option in potentially identified secondary latent 
TB infection (LTBI) cases due to the resistance pattern 
of the index patient.
A general information about the event was shared 
within the European Union through the European 
Commissions’s Early Warning and Response System 
(EWRS) and with the WHO through the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) National Focal Point. To our 
knowledge, no contact tracing investigation was initi-
ated for the flight from the respective country in the 
eastern part of the WHO European Region to Turkey.
Here we describe the contact investigation conducted 
by the concerned German health authorities for the 
flight from Turkey to Germany. The objectives of our 
investigation were to describe the exposure situation, 
to identify potentially exposed persons, to be able to 
inform the identified contact persons about the inci-
dent and to initiate laboratory investigations of poten-
tial TB infections in order to better assess the exposure 
situation, to inform about the risk of becoming infected 
and to prevent further infections. The study should add 
evidence of the risk of TB transmission on aircraft.
Methods
Criteria for contact tracing after TB exposure on aircraft 
as recommended by RAGIDA [3] vs criteria used in the 
present investigation are shown in Figure 1.
We used standardised definitions for case assessment. 
The exposure was defined as sharing the same flight 
as the index patient from Turkey to Germany in July 
2013; case assessment, categories of exposures and 
case definitions are shown in Table 1.
The comprehensive contact investigation strategy 
included (i) contacting the National Focal Point for the 
IHR in the country of origin of the index patient in order 
to obtain information on the course of the disease, the 
therapy given and potential evidence for transmissions 
to household contacts or other close contacts as rec-
ommended by the RAGIDA guidelines; (ii) requesting 
a list of all passengers and crew members with their 
contact details from the involved airline by the respon-
sible health authority; (iii) contacting by telephone 
one of the passengers who gave first aid and by email 
the involved crew members through their countries 
health authorities to establish more specific informa-
tion on the exposure during the flight; (iv) distribution 
of a structured questionnaire to the responsible health 
Figure 1
Criteria for initiating contact tracing after tuberculosis 
exposure on aircraft [3] vs TB contact tracing after XDR-
TB-exposure in an aircraft, Germany, 2013
RAGIDA recommendation Present investigation
Yes
Evidence of transmission to close contacts 
(household and other close contacts) given?
Patient with infectious pulmonary TB?
Incident reported ?
Flight duration 8 hours or longer?
Flight took place less than 3 months before the diagnosis?
Contact trace in the same row, 
two rows ahead and two rows 
behind the index case.







RAGIDA: Risk Assessment Guidance for Infectious Diseases 




Affected aircraft (A) without labelling; (B) with labelling of passengers and crew, by high and medium exposure risk groups 


























LTBI case, evidence of transmission 
(probable) (n=1)
LTBI case, transmission cannot be 
excluded (n=14)
No LTBI case, transmission cannot be
excluded (n=13)
No LTBI case (n=70)
Probable boosting effect (n=3)
Positive test followed by negative test (n=11)
No testing (n=50)
High risk exposure (n=7)
Medium risk exposure (n=34)
Area in the rear of the aircraft, 
where hemoptysis and first aid took place
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LTBI: latent tuberculosis infection; TST: tuberculin skin test; XDR-TB: extensively drug-resistant-TB.
TST positivity: induration > 10 mm.
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authorities both in Germany and abroad containing 
questions on the history of TB, Bacillus Calmette-Guérin 
(BCG) vaccination status, existing underlying diseases, 
category of exposure during the flight, results of tests 
for LTBI; (v) requesting testing of all contact persons for 
LTBI coordinated by the responsible health authorities.
To distinguish previous TB infections from those newly 
acquired, the responsible health authorities were asked 
to test the contact persons twice: once as early as pos-
sible after the exposure and once at least 8 weeks after 
the exposure. In Germany, interferon gamma release 
assays (IGRA) were used in adults and tuberculin skin 
test (TST) in children according to the national rec-
ommendations [6]. In children, additional IGRA test-
ing was requested to improve the sensitivity of LTBI 
diagnosis. Health authorities outside of Germany were 
asked to follow their respective national guidelines. A 
positive TST was regarded as an induration size of > 10 
mm diameter; TST test conversion > 5  mm induration 
increase was considered as newly acquired infection 
to be distinguished from the boosting effect [7,8]. All 
contact persons with at least one positive TST or IGRA 
were supposed to have active TB excluded according to 
national guidelines.
The collected data were analysed descriptively using 
STATA (StataCorp. 2015. Stata Statistical Software: 
Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP): age, 
sex, criteria for case assessment, exposure categories, 
case definitions, test systems, test results and other 
key factors were considered.
Ethics and data protection
A formal ethical review process and approval 
was not required for this outbreak investiga-
tion in accordance with article 25, section 1 of 
the IfSG (The German Protection against Infection 
Table 1
Standardised definitions for case assessment, categories of exposures and for cases, tuberculosis (TB) contact tracing after 
XDR-TB-exposure in an aircraft, Germany, 2013
Criteria for case assesment 
Increased risk of acquiring LTBI 
or increased risk of progression 
to active TB
Specific case assessment for children younger than 5 years of age (because of an increased 
susceptibility to infection and the risk of rapid progression), pregnant women, persons with 
comorbidities such as diabetes mellitus, cancer or immunodeficiencies and for immunocompromised 
persons (because of an increased risk for progression from TB infection to active TB).
Increased risk for pre-existing 
LTBI
Contact persons who fulfilled one of the following criteria: birth or prolonged stay, including residency, 
in a high incidence country for TB (> 40 TB disease cases per 100,000 inhabitants) [22]; previous contact 
to a patient with infectious TB, regular contact with TB risk populations or a positive TST- and / or IGRA-
result in the past.
BCG vaccination Documentation or recall of at least one administered BCG vaccination.
Categories of exposure 
High risk exposure
Persons who gave first aid to the index patient, who were in the close proximity of the index case while 
coughing, who talked to the index patient or who had contact with potentially infectious material or 
performed an aerosolising measure (e. g. intubation).
Medium risk exposure (extended 
RAGIDA group [3])
Contact persons who sat within two rows in front or behind the index patient or those who sat within the 
last two rows of the aircraft where the bleeding occurred, if not in the high risk exposure group.
Low risk exposure Not in the high or medium risk exposure group.
Case definitions 
LTBI case, pre-existing before 
the flight exposure A contact person with at least one positive TST or IGRA tested within 3 weeks after the exposure.
LTBI case, evidence of 
transmission (probable)
A contact person tested negative by TST or IGRA within 8 weeks after the exposure AND tested at least 
once positive by TST or IGRA between 8th week and 9 months after the exposure.
LTBI case, evidence of 
transmission (possible)
A person tested negative by TST or IGRA within 3 weeks after the exposure AND tested at least once 
positive by TST or IGRA between the 3rd and 8th weeks after the exposure.
LTBI case, transmission cannot 
be excluded
A contact person in whom TST or IGRA were not performed within 3 weeks after the exposure AND EITHER 
tested at least once positive by TST or IGRA between the 3rd and 8th week after the exposure OR in whom 
TST or IGRA were not performed between the 3rd and 8th week after the exposure AND tested at least 
once positive by TST or IGRA between the 8th week and 9th month after the exposure.
No LTBI case, transmission 
cannot be excluded
A contact person tested at least once with TST or IGRA within 8 weeks after the exposure, all test results 
negative AND no further TST or IGRA was performed between the 8th week and 9th month after exposure.
No LTBI case, no evidence of 
transmission
A contact person tested at least once with TST or IGRA, all test results negative and tested at least once 
negative with tests performed between the 8th week and 9th month after the exposure.
Person probably showing the 
boosting effect
A contact person tested positive by TST following a first negative TST with an induration increase of ≤ 
5 mm.
Person with a negative test 
following a positive test A contact person with a negative test following a positive test (TST or IGRA).
BCG: Bacillus Calmette–Guérin; IGRA: interferon gamma release assays; LTBI: latent TB infection; RAGIDA: Risk Assessment Guidance for 
Infectious Diseases transmitted on Aircraft; TST: tuberculin skin test; TB: tuberculosis; XDR-TB: extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis.
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Act–Infektionsschutzgesetz) [9]. All questionnaires 
and samples were fully anonymised before analysis.
Results
Information from the country of origin of the index 
patient about the course of the disease, the therapy 
administered and potential transmission in this coun-
try was not available despite several requests.
One month after the flight, contradictory to the infor-
mation gained from passengers at the very beginning 
of the investigation, the interview conducted with the 
passenger giving first aid to the deceased patient and 
the information provided by the crew members sug-
gested that the index patient stayed seated until ca 30 
min before landing in Germany and did not move about 
the whole aircraft. The haemoptysis event was limited 
in time and place: it explicitly occurred in the last half 
hour of the flight in the back part of the aircraft where 
first aid also was given.
A passenger list with contact information of the passen-
gers was available 22 days after the incident took place 
(a first passenger list without contact information was 
available the day of the event); it contained contact 
details of the majority of passengers (95%; 147/155). All 
seven crew members were reached through the health 
authorities of the airline’s home country. The 155 pas-
sengers and seven crew members were of 17 different 
nationalities but predominantly German (n  =  67; 41%) 
and Turkish (n = 51; 31%). The median age of the con-
tact persons was 34 years (range: 1 to 71 years); five 
were younger than 5 years of age, nine were between 5 
and 14 years, 112 (69%) were between 15 and 49 years 
and 36 were 50 years old or older. Of all, 96 (59%) were 
male.
The questionnaire response rate was 83% (135/162); 
stratified in exposure groups, the response rates 
were 100% (7/7) in the high risk exposure group, 62% 
(21/34) in the medium risk exposure group (extended 
RAGIDA group) and 88% (107/121) in the low exposure 
group. Overall, 80 questionnaires were provided by 
health authorities in Germany and 55 by health author-
ities in other countries. Several countries considered 
the duration of the flight too short to warrant TB con-
tact tracing.
Table 2 summarises the main results regarding catego-
ries of exposure and case definitions.
Criteria for case assessment
Overall, 9 (8%) of the 112 contact persons tested had 
an increased risk for acquiring LTBI or increased risk 
for progression to active TB: four contact persons 
were children younger than 5 years of age; five per-
sons reported comorbidities (diabetes mellitus (n = 4); 
cancer (n  =  1)). No one reported being pregnant or 
immunocompromised.
An increased risk for pre-existing LTBI was documented 
in two (2%) of the 112 contact persons tested: one per-
son originated from a high incidence country for TB, 
another person reported a previous contact to an infec-
tious TB patient. None of the contact persons stated a 
positive TST or IGRA or a TB treatment in the past.
A total of 39 (35%) of the 112 persons tested declared 
that they had received BCG vaccination, 28 persons 
also stated the date of vaccination. The BCG vacci-
nated contact persons were mainly Turkish (n  =  28), 
but also German (n = 9) and Japanese (n = 2). While 14 
(13%) persons declared that they had never received a 
BCG vaccination, the BCG status of 59 (53%) persons 
remained unknown.
Categories of exposures
Seven (6%) of the 112 contact persons tested had a high 
risk exposure: 5 had given first aid to the index patient 
(3 crew members and 2 passengers); one passenger 
sat in the close proximity of the index patient when 
coughing and another passenger talked to the index 
patient. The latter passenger was seated right next to 
the index patient and therefore was only assessed in 
the high risk exposure group.
Table 2
Number of tested contact persons (passengers and crew members) by categories of exposure and LTBI case definitions, 
tuberculosis contact tracing after XDR-TB exposure on aircraft, Germany, 2013 (n = 112)
Risk exposure group (number of persons)
Case definition High Medium Low Total
LTBI case, evidence for transmission (probable) 0 1 0 1 
LTBI case, transmission cannot be excluded 1 2 11 14 
No LTBI case, transmission cannot be excluded 1 1 11 13 
No LTBI 5 9 56 70 
Probably boosting effect 0 2 1 3 
Negative test following positive test 0 2 9 11 
Total 7 17 88 112 
LTBI: latent tuberculosis infection; XDR-TB: extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis
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Seventeen (15%) of the 112 contact persons tested were 
grouped in the medium risk exposure group as they sat 
within two rows in front or behind the index patient or 
within two rows from the rear toilet.
Another 88 (79%) of the 112 contact persons tested 
were classified into the low risk exposure group.
Case definitions
LTBI testing was performed in 112 (69%) contact per-
sons; stratified in exposure groups, the testing rates 
were 100% (7/7) in the high risk exposure group, 50% 
(17/34) in the medium risk exposure group (extended 
RAGIDA group) and 73% (88/121) in the low risk expo-
sure group. However, the assessment of a test conver-
sion was only possible in 61 (54%) of the 112 persons 
tested. Seventy (63%) of them were male. Twenty-nine 
(26%) of the 112 contact persons tested positive for LTBI 
at least once; of those, 12 were male. By use of logis-
tic regression we could not find any tendency between 
age groups and test positivity (data not shown).
Evidence of probable transmission of LTBI was estab-
lished in one passenger. This person was a young 
Turkish adult, who had received BCG vaccination and 
sat in the last row close to the cabin toilet, where the 
index patient collapsed (medium risk exposure). Six 
weeks after the exposure, their TST induration was 
2 mm and 6 months after the exposure, the TST indu-
ration was 14 mm; no abnormality was detected in an 
X-ray which was performed at the same time as the 
first TST (Figure 2). This passenger did not recall any 
contact with another TB case in the past or between 
the two tests.
In 14 LTBI cases, recent transmission could not be 
excluded; of those, 12 were of Turkish and two of 
German nationality; of the 10 who had received BCG 
vaccination, all had Turkish nationality. Most (n  =  11) 
were grouped in the low exposure group, two persons 
were classified into the medium exposure group (one 
German passenger with diabetes mellitus and one 
Turkish passenger who was had received BCG vacci-
nation and sat in the last row), and one person was 
categorised in the high exposure group (Turkish pas-
senger who gave first aid and had unknown BCG vac-
cination status) (Figure 2). However, this person might 
have been exposed to TB during their professional life 
as emergency physician.
Three persons, of Turkish nationality, showed a proba-
ble boosting effect (increase of induration < 6 mm). Two 
of them sat in the last row (medium exposure group), 
one of them had received BCG vaccination. Induration 
was in both persons 10 mm in the first TST and 15 mm 
in the second TST. The third person was from the low 
exposure group and their induration increased by 4 mm 
(Figure 2).
Overall, 11 cases had a negative test result following 
a positive test result; they were of German (n  =  6), 
Turkish (n = 4) and United States (US) (n = 1) national-
ity. Three persons had received BCG vaccination.
Three children younger than 5 years of age with no his-
tory of BCG vaccination belong to this category: they all 
were TST-negative in July/August and in October 2013, 
but IGRA-positive in October 2013 (0.62; 0.92; and 1.00 
IU/mL; the cut off is 0.35 IU/mL); these positive results 
could not be confirmed in January/February 2014 (all 
IGRA negative: 0.12; and each 0.00 IU/mL). Chest 
X-rays were normal. All three children belonged to the 
low risk exposure category and were born in Germany 
(Figure 2).
No active TB was diagnosed in any of the contacts with 
at least one positive TST or IGRA.
A total of 83 (74%) contact persons tested LTBI-negative 
at least once: 13 of those were not tested again at least 
8 weeks after the flight exposure, therefore a possible 
test conversion could not be excluded; for 70 (63%) 
there was no evidence of infection (Figure 2).
Discussion and conclusion
We describe a rare fatal event on board of an aircraft 
that involved a person with XDR-TB travelling from 
a country in the eastern part of the WHO European 
Region via Turkey to Germany. The subsequent contact 
tracing revealed one LTBI in an exposed passenger, 
which we consider a probable newly acquired infection.
For a comprehensive assessment of the patient’s infec-
tiousness, relevant information from the country of ori-
gin could not be obtained. Strengthening information 
exchange within the IHR (2005) [10] is crucial not only 
for prevention of cross-border transmission of disease 
but also for rational planning of contact tracing and 
control activities.
This incident raises an important issue about the 
strategy of contact tracing investigations in situations 
that go beyond common scenarios. Contact tracing is 
recommended only when the flight duration equals 
or exceeds 8 hours [3,11]. The flight from Turkey to 
Germany lasted only 3 hours, and no information was 
available whether any transmission to close contacts 
had already occurred before travelling. Nevertheless, 
German health authorities jointly with health authori-
ties from abroad, started and proceeded with the 
investigation on the grounds that the index patient 
presumably had highly infectious pulmonary cavitary 
XDR-TB, and therefore posed a public health threat. The 
contact investigation activities also went beyond the 
recommended tracing of passengers sitting in seats of 
the same row, two rows ahead and behind the index 
patient, as the index patient was initially reported by 
several passengers as having moved around in the air-
craft and coughing blood, which may have resulted in 
potential spread of aerosols during the flight. However, 
the reports regarding the index patient’s behaviour 
were contradictory: in contrast to some passengers’ 
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observations, one passenger giving first aid and the 
airline crew stated at a later point in time, that the 
haemoptysis event occurred in the last half hour of the 
flight, in the back part of the aircraft where the cabin 
toilets are.
The airline supported the investigation in general very 
well. To further ease the assessment of the exposure 
situation, a short written summary of the event would 
have been helpful at the beginning of the investiga-
tion, as suggested by the International Air Transport 
Association [12].
While no appropriate preventive treatment for latent 
infection by XDR-TB strains is available, professional 
risk communication and provision of information to 
exposed passengers and crew members can help avoid 
diagnostic delays and ensure rapid drug susceptibily 
testing and effective treatment, should they develop 
TB following the event. This is particularly important in 
contacts with an increased risk for progression, such 
as young children or persons with co-morbidities and 
immunosuppression, who require careful follow-up 
[13].
There are examples of similar decisions made in France 
[14] in case of an exposure to an XDR-TB case who trav-
elled to Paris on a 5-hour flight. Canadian guidelines 
recommend performing contact tracing regardless of 
the flight duration if former transmission to close con-
tacts cannot be determined and laryngeal TB, MDR-TB 
or XDR-TB is present [15].
The contact investigation is an example of good inter-
national cooperation: the response rate (83%) from the 
standardised contact tracing questionnaire was rather 
high, most probably due to the unusual event and the 
enduring efforts made by the investigation team; most 
of the health authorities abroad supported the investi-
gation by using the provided questionnaire and sharing 
results. However, some countries chose not to perform 
contact tracing; one reason given was the duration of 
exposure which was less than 8 hours.
Health authorities were asked to follow their national 
guidelines. Therefore, testing approaches and test 
intervals differed substantially, which impacts com-
parability and interpretation of test results. Results 
of second tests were accepted if performed within 9 
months after exposure. This increases the chance of 
being re-exposed, especially for persons originating 
from countries or settings with a higher TB prevalence.
One of the biggest challenges was the absence of a 
fast reliable testing method for detection of a recent TB 
infection. The confirmation of a newly acquired infec-
tion with acceptable certainty requires two tests within 
a defined and narrow time period; however, for various 
reasons this strategy is often difficult to put into prac-
tice. TB exposure during flights frequently becomes 
evident very late, and early testing may therefore not 
be feasible.
Even though 69% of the contact persons could be 
tested for LTBI at least once, assessment for test con-
version was only feasible in 54% of them. One reason 
was that some contacts were only tested once, another 
reason was that some contacts were tested twice but 
not early enough for the first time (according to the 
WHO guidelines, within 3 weeks after exposure [11]) to 
find out their basic status of infection. This underlines 
the importance of a standardised testing procedure. 
The relatively high LTBI prevalence (26%) among con-
tact persons highlights the significance of performing 
a first test for TB infection within 3 weeks after expo-
sure, to identify pre-existing LTBI. A similar positivity 
rate was found in a US study about TB contact tracing 
on aircrafts, where within a 1.5 year period, 182/758 
individuals (24%) were found to be positive [16].
The sensitivity of an IGRA (85–90%) and a TST is com-
parable, but the specificity is higher in IGRA (98%) 
[17,18], as BCG vaccinations and most non-tuberculous 
mycobacteria infections do not induce a false-positive 
result [19]. In this investigation, 35% of contact persons 
stated to be vaccinated against TB. The boosting effect 
could not be excluded in vaccinated contact persons; 
most contact persons with Turkish nationality should 
have received BCG vaccination. In Turkey, BCG vaccina-
tion after birth is obligatory and until the late 1990s it 
was recommended to be repeated at 7, 14 and 20 years 
of age [19-21]. Therefore, we are well aware that TST 
results in Turkish contact persons, who stated not to 
have received BCG vaccination, should be interpreted 
with caution. In vaccinated contact persons IGRA tests 
should be used to rule out boosting due to BCG [7,8,19]. 
Excluding contacts with known BCG vaccination by 
default seems questionable, as these contacts remain 
at risk for infection and progression to active disease.
We regarded one contact person with a TST conversion 
as a probable LTBI secondary case even though they 
stated having received BCG vaccination. Transmission 
cannot be excluded in the LTBI-positive contact person 
who gave first aid to the index patient; however, they 
might have been exposed to TB during their profes-
sional life as emergency physician.
Notably, there were 11 persons whose LTBI test result 
eventually reverted from positive to negative, however, 
it is impossible to differentiate between false-positive 
or false-negative test results. Among the 11, three were 
children younger than 5 years of age; their treating 
paediatricians reasoned that the positive IGRA-results 
from October 2013 were false-positive and LTBI was 
not probable in these children. The use of both test-
ing procedures (TST and IGRA) was regarded as worth-
while by these paediatricians. Strikingly, four persons 
with positive TST or IGRA sat in the last row of the air-
craft: the probable secondary LTBI case, two persons 
with possible boosting effect who both sat next to the 
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probable LTBI case, and one person with LTBI that was 
possibly acquired before the flight exposure.
Keeping in mind that passengers who are apparently 
ill might be asked to change seats, we deem it impor-
tant to include in the current RAGIDA TB guidelines that 
the responsible health authority should check whether 
index patients switched seats or suffered a disease-
specific event within the aircraft which necessitates an 
expansion of the number of contacts to be traced.
Contact tracing after an exposure on aircraft is a 
resource-intensive measure and its initiation should be 
well-balanced with the expected outcome. However, in 
situations that are considered to be extremely serious 
due to potential risk of transmission of M/XDR-TB, an 
individual risk assessment is needed.
The yield of the investigation strongly depends on the 
performance of the diagnostic test and an applicable 
test strategy. Further efforts are needed to develop 
eligible tests which allow the detection of a newly 
acquired TB infection and which indicate the risk of 
progression of TB infection to active TB.
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